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Over the previous two decades, many OECD countries have lowered the degree of 
progressivity in their tax structures. In this paper, I investigate labour tax progression in a 
world characterised by a segmented labour market where the higher-paying jobs are rationed 
due to (i) oligopolistic market structures, (ii) insider-oriented unions and (iii) international 
offshoring. In this second-best world, a revenue-neutral decrease in the progressivity of the 
tax schedule promotes higher domestic (net-of-tax) wage inequality where a shrinking 
fraction of workers provides the tax revenue to finance the redistribution to an increasing 
share of lower-wage  workers. However, as the tax reform involves an increase in the 
offshoring intensity, which may translate into  a cost advantage for the domestic average 
consumer, the overall welfare effect is ambiguous. It is shown that  the negative effects 
dominate if trade unions are sufficiently insider-oriented. 
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Evidence shows that traditionally unionised countries are undergoing several unprecedented labour market
changes such as a sharp increase in the share of employees hired on temporary contracts, involving the risk
of becoming 'trapped' in precarious jobs (Dolado et al., 2002; Bentolila et al., 2008; European Commission, 2008
and 2010, chapter 3); an increase in dualism whereby workers on stable contracts coexist with workers on tem-
porary contracts (Boeri, 2010); an increase in the share of workers that take jobs for which they possess excess
educational qualications, contributing to job-dissatisfaction (Dolado et al., 2000; Green, 2010); and growing
low-wage sectors (Lucifora et al., 2005; Bosch and Kalina, 2008).
While the underlying causes for these developments may be manifold, they point to the prevalence of job
rationing in occupations oering better pay and attractive career opportunities, and its interaction with institu-
tionally shaped patterns in product and labour markets. In addition, the ongoing trend in emerging economies
towards producing increasingly skill-intensive goods and services is likely to play a role, as it fosters global
labour arbitrage even of higher-paying jobs typically considered insulated from global competition (OECD, 2007;
Blinder, 2006).
Even if workers experience downward wage pressure and rising employment insecurity due to more intense
global competition, it is often claimed that they can gain as consumers, as they enjoy lower prices, and they can
gain as shareholders - provided they own shares.1 Prot income, however, typically accrues disproportionately
to a small layer in society. Therefore, the support for globalisation is ultimately determined by how well-o the
average worker feels. In view of the perceived lack of inuence over global developments, policy-makers face
mounting pressure in understanding the potential societal outcomes of dierent scal policy choices.
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on how changes in the structure of labour income taxation may
aect welfare in a small open economy within the context of international oshoring, strategically interacting
rms, and a segmented domestic labour market.2 The focus is motivated by three observations. First, in many
OECD countries major reforms have taken place over the past few decades, aimed at reducing the degree of
personal income tax progressivity (see gure A.1 in Appendix A). The trend towards atter tax systems has
1See, for example, The Economist (2006) for this line of reasoning.
2Due to the prominence of labour income related taxes in nancing redistribution in many OECD countries, and due to the
limited research on the welfare eects of such taxes in the presence of capital and rm mobility, the present paper focuses only on
labour taxes. For an analysis of optimal capital taxation in a framework with a small open economy and a segmented labour market,
see Koskela and Sch ob (2005).
2come about by an increased reliance on social security contributions { which tend to be levied at at rates {,
a reduction in statutory rates, as well as a reduction in the number of tax brackets (OECD, 2006; European
Commission, 2007).3 In eect, the progressivity of the tax system is dened by how wide tax brackets are and
by the extent to which taxation is steadily increasing as a percentage of income. Second, I build on the broad
consensus that a decrease (increase) in marginal tax rates, for given average tax rates, increases (reduces) work
eort when the labour market is competitive, whereas it increases (reduces) the wage pressure when the labour
market is non-competitive (e.g. Koskela and Vilmunen, 1996; Lockwood et al., 2000).4 In view of the importance
of the regulation of contracts via collective agreements signed by unions in Europe (Visser, 2006), the latter
eect should play a crucial role and has indeed been conrmed empirically for a large number of European
countries (see Schneider, 2005, and references therein). Finally, the third consideration is that markets are often
dominated by large rms that interact strategically and have the possibility to take advantage of international
dierences in factor prices by oshoring production to lower-cost countries. Recent evidence suggests that the
role of geographic distance on the decision to oshore manufacturing operations and services around the globe
has markedly diminished over time (e.g. Head et al., 2009).
Based upon these notions, I consider a small open welfare economy in which domestic workers may either
be employed in an oligopolistic sector (denoted as primary sector) where rms perceive competitive pressure
from rival rms located in the domestic and foreign countries or, alternatively, workers may be employed in a
competitive sector (denoted as secondary sector). Jobs in the primary sector are better paid and regarded as
superior as the presence of imperfect product market competition generates rents which are shared with the
workers in that sector, all of whom are represented by a trade union.5 Workers in the secondary sector do not
possess bargaining power6 and are entitled to a subsidy, which is nanced by taxes that are levied on primary
sector workers' earnings. A central assumption is that primary sector rms are able to access global supplies of
relatively low-wage labour by shifting entire production processes abroad. In this setup, the government uses
3For a detailed country-specic tax progression analysis over a particularly long time span refer to e.g. Schratzenstaller and
Wagener (2009). A recent contribution comparing various dimensions of tax progression across countries and time is provided by
Pogorelskiy et al. (2010).
4This is because \a progressive tax is a tax on wage increases. When workers are represented by unions with preferences over
wages and employment, the `price' { in terms of forgone employment { of a higher take-home wage goes up. Thus, other things
equal, the union will negotiate a lower pretax wage. This may be called the wage moderation eect of progressivity." (Lockwood
et al., 2000, p. 708). The negative relationship between marginal tax rates and pre-tax wages carries over to models that assume
labour markets which are characterised by eciency wages (e.g. Hoel, 1990).
5In practice, it is well known that labour markets are divided into tiers and wages may dier considerably across sectors, even
for equally skilled workers (see for example Saint-Paul, 1996).
6For a motivation see Cahuc et al. (2006) and Bosch and Kalina (2008).
3progressive labour taxes as an instrument to aect welfare via several channels. On the one hand, a change in
the degree of tax progression has a direct inuence on union wage-setting. On the other hand, by changing the
relative international labour costs it aects the oshoring incentives within the primary sector which in its turn
has repercussions on the domestic sectoral allocation of employment, the net-of-tax wages and consumer prices.
The main results of this study are as follows. A revenue-neutral decrease in the degree of income tax pro-
gression, at constant average tax rates, causes a higher domestic net-of-tax wage inequality and a decrease in the
aggregate domestic wage income. Essentially this happens because, compared to employment increases, wage
increases become a more attractive means for the trade union to raise the domestic primary sector labour income.
A higher pre-tax wage, in turn, strengthens the incentives for outward production relocations. As a result, those
rms that maintain their production processes in the domestic country are reduced in number, face ercer rivalry
from their competitors located in lower wage countries and therefore earn lower prots. This contributes to a
lower domestic primary sector employment, the displaced workers being absorbed in the domestic lower wage
sector. Yet, oshoring opens up the possibility that domestic consumers are on average more than compensated
for both the reduction in aggregate labour income and the loss in domestic competitiveness, provided that they
face suciently lower consumer prices. Importantly, the outcome of this trade-o critically depends on the trade
union's preference prole. It is shown that the benets of a higher oshoring intensity in terms of lower foreign
production costs are too weak to compensate the average domestic consumer for the negative domestic labour
market eects if the trade union's inclination to share a given rent among fewer rather than more workers is
strongly pronounced. It follows that a decrease in tax progression unambiguously lowers welfare if the trade
union is suciently insider-oriented.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a survey of the related literature. Section 3
introduces the general features of the model. Section 4 analyses the output and employment decisions of primary
sector rms, the wage formation in the primary sector, and the locational equilibrium of rms. Section 5 discusses
how changes in the labour income tax structure aect welfare. Concluding remarks follow in section 6.
42 Related literature
This paper relates to several strands of the literature. On a more general level, it is connected to papers that
examine how the possibilities of substituting domestic for foreign jobs in the production process aect domestic
labour markets. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) formulate a model of oshoring with perfectly competitive
product and labour markets where domestic workers specialise on tasks in which their relative productivity is
greatest while the remaining tasks are oshored to lower wage countries. Since the oshored complementary
input is relatively cheaper, the average domestic productivity increases which benets domestic workers via
higher wages. Hence, oshoring is viewed as domestic technical progress. One signicant dierence with respect
to the present work is that the model relies on a substantial part of production being carried out in the domestic
country so that domestic workers can reap the benets of production fragmentation. By contrast, the present
paper allows for entire production processes to be oshored. This is in keeping with the notion that moving
unnished goods back and forth between dierent countries along the production chain is too expensive when
rms have global access to abundant low-cost labour at all skill levels.7 Karabay and McLaren (2010) focus on
the risk aspects related to the increased volatility of workers' incomes as markets become increasingly integrated.
Using alternative proxies for oshoring, Senses (2010) provides evidence that the labour demand elasticities
for production workers in the U.S. manufacturing sector are positively associated with increased exposure to
oshoring. Other recent empirical papers exploring the relationship between globalisation and labour demand
elasticities include Scheve and Slaughter (2004) and Hijzen and Swaim (2010).
None of these contributions addresses the role of redistributive policies in aecting the relationship between
oshoring and labour markets. The issue is particularly relevant in the context of European welfare states
with highly regulated labour markets. In this respect, Koskela and Sch ob (2010) discuss how dierent labour
tax and welfare reforms aect employment when a representative, perfectly competitive rm can replace a part
of its homogeneous, unionised workforce with lower wage workers via international outsourcing. One central
result is that the positive association between tax progression and employment is robust to outsourcing. In
a model where complementary workers dier in skill and only the low skilled workers are exposed to the risk
of unemployment due to both search unemployment and outsourcing, Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) show that
7See Harms et al. (2009) for a similar assumption.
5a redistribution of income via an increase in a linear income tax on high-skilled workers and a decrease in
the tax burden of low-skilled workers improves welfare. The underlying mechanism is that the reform lowers
the gross wages of low-skilled workers thereby lowering the degree of outsourcing and increasing labour market
participation. Moreover, high-skilled workers, whose wage is xed, are assumed to share the benets of the higher
prots. Rocha-Akis and Sch ob (2011) investigate how changes in the social security system aect labour markets
in the context of internationally mobile production and strategic wage bargaining between unionised labour and
oligopolistic rms. The main nding is that deeper economic integration need not undermine redistributive goals
as the threat of job oshoring compels unions to carry the cost of redistribution in terms of lower net wages. Only
if redistribution exceeds a critical level will some trade unions choose a high-wage/low-employment policy which
is associated with oshoring and domestic job losses. Aronsson and Sj ogren (2004) discuss optimal nonlinear
taxation under right-to-manage wage formation and mobile production in the context of international policy
coordination.
All papers mentioned so far ignore the possibility of equally skilled workers receiving dierent wages in dierent
sectors of the economy. The perspective that labour markets are segmented into good and bad jobs is taken up
in Kleven and Srensen (2004) and Lommerud et al. (2004) who analyse the implications of redistribution by
means of labour tax progression in a closed economy with perfectly competitive rms. The studies yield conicting
insights regarding the desirability of raising labour income tax progression. In Lommerud et al. (2004) primary
sector workers share industry rents whereas secondary sector workers do not. One key result is that the optimal
policy involves the use of progressive taxation provided that unions are strong and the government's inclination
for income equality is high. By contrast, Kleven and Srensen (2004) consider a dual labour market where
the wage in the primary sector is formed according to an eciency wage mechanism. The authors consider a
revenue-neutral increase in progression that involves a higher average tax rate on primary sector workers' wages
and a lower corresponding tax on the wage of secondary sector workers. The central message there is that the
positive association between tax progression and employment is not robust to the introduction of dual labour
markets, the reason being that under the assumption of zero prot under perfect competition an increase in the
average tax rate requires higher equilibrium gross wages if a given eort level is to be maintained. This in turn
reduces aggregate employment and demand.
63 The model
I consider a country that is composed of two sectors: a primary sector characterised by an oligopolistic market
structure where rms share part of their rents with organised labour, and a secondary sector in which goods are
produced under perfect competition thus oering comparatively low-paying jobs.8 The country is inhabited by
T internationally immobile consumer-workers who each supply one unit of labour inelastically and have identical
preferences. They derive utility from the consumption of primary and secondary goods according to the following
quasi-linear utility function:9
u(x;y) = x   1
2x2 + y; (1)
where x designates the homogeneous primary sector good and y is the good produced in the secondary sector. In
accordance with other recent models that concentrate on the implications of labour market segmentation, I retain
the assumption that workers are identical ex ante, being randomly allocated to the sectors.10 The tax system is
redistributive in that secondary sector workers are entitled to receive an exogenously xed governmental transfer,
b, while only primary sector workers contribute to its nancing. Moreover, I consider a progressive tax structure
within the primary sector, that is, the tax system allows for a redistribution of income towards the less well-o




!1(1   ) + a

+ (1   s)(!c + b)  y + px; (2)
where s 2 (0;1) corresponds to the share of workers employed in the domestic primary sector, !1 is the gross
primary sector wage,  denotes the marginal labour income tax rate, a is the level of tax exemption granted, !c
is the competitive wage rms pay to workers in the secondary sector, and p is the price of the primary good.11
(The superscript 1 generally refers to the primary sector.)
8Taking a more general perspective, the secondary sector might include the informal sector.
9See Hauer and Mittermaier (2011) for a similar specication.
10See e.g. Kleven and Srensen (2004) and Lommerud et al. (2004).
11Note that one could easily introduce a public good that is nanced by a lump-sum tax levied on all workers. This, however,
would complicate the analysis without providing additional insights.
7The model has four stages. In the rst stage, the government decides whether and how to reform the
labour income tax structure which is regarded as exogenous by all rms and workers. Then, primary sector
rms choose their production locations upon a comparison of potential prots at the domestic and the foreign
location. In doing so, they anticipate the union's reaction to international shifts in industrial production. Given
the locational equilibrium, the union sets the primary sector pre-tax wage in full knowledge of the consequences
for primary sector employment, that is, subject to the rms' labour demand schedules. Finally, the rms choose
their production and employment levels at their respective locations. The analysis is performed by backward
induction.
4 The primary sector
4.1 Output and employment
In the primary sector, N rms engaging in quantity competition produce good x for the domestic market,
according to a constant-returns-to-scale technology where units are chosen so that one unit of labour input
produces one unit of output. Labour is the only input in production. I assume that barriers to entry into the
industry protect all incumbent rms from new entrants. The demand for good x is obtained by maximising the
per-capita consumer's utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2), which is assumed to hold with equality,
and aggregating over the number of consumers yielding p(X) =    (X=T), where  > 0; > 0, and X is the
aggregate output in the industry. All primary sector rms are internationally mobile and can therefore choose
between producing domestically and producing in the foreign country (representing the rest of the world).12 Let
m be the number of rms located abroad so that (N  m) is the number of rms that produce domestically, and
assume that unit costs are constant and equal to the respective unit wages, which rms take as given. The prot
of rm j is j =

p(X)   !j





   !1   m
 
!1   !f
 (1 + N)
; (3)
12It is assumed that international markets are segmented from the viewpoint of rms. That is to say, the rms' decisions regarding
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where xd and xf denote the individual output (employment) levels of the rms producing in the domestic and
the foreign country, respectively. Positive domestic primary sector output requires !1 < ( + m!f)=(1 + m)
whereas output is produced abroad i !f < ( + (N   m)!1)=(1 + N   m).13 The total equilibrium industry
output is then given by
X(m) = (N   m)xd + mxf =
T

N   (N   m)!1   m!f
(1 + N)
; (5)





; k = d;f: (6)
4.2 Wage determination
The only dierence between both production locations relates to the labour market: whereas labour in the
primary sector is unionised in the domestic country, I assume that the foreign wage, !f, is lower and exogenously
given.14 Following much of the literature on unionised oligopolies (e.g. Lommerud et al., 2006 and included
references), I assume that the wage in the primary sector is set by a monopoly union which is fully aware of
the consequences of its wage demands for the rms' employment decisions.15 The union wage is legally binding
for all domestic primary sector employers.16 It is further assumed that the union is not able to aect the
rms' location decisions strategically. Rather, it is the rms who are forward-looking actors and conjecture the
union's behaviour.17 Consequently, the union takes the industrial distribution of rms across countries as given.
13The latter protability constraint always holds in equilibrium (cf. equation (9)).
14The exogeneity of the foreign wage is motivated by the large increase in the world supply of (unskilled and skilled) workers
associated with the fast growth in the informationalisation and industrialisation in countries such as China, India and the former
Soviet Union. Even if labour costs rise at a particular foreign location, I implicitly assume that there are sucient opportunities for
rms to relocate production to some other foreign country so as to maintain a stable cost level.
15The monopoly union model is closely related to the more general right-to-manage model in which the wage is bargained by
collective agreement between the trade union and the rms. The similarity between these models is that in both approaches the
outcome lies on the labour demand curve. As shall be seen below, in the present specication the equilibrium on the demand curve
depends, among other factors, on the union-specic preference prole.
16As reasoned in Hauer and Mittermaier (2011), the assumption of a sector-specic union is appropriate in the European context
where collective agreements occur predominantly at industry level.
17Anecdotal evidence suggests that \while employers govern the [relocation] process until the decision is taken, the unions usually
get involved at a very late stage and often can only try to cope with its consequences."(EIRO, 2005, p. 30)
9Typically unions wish to maximise both employment and wages. But since these goals work against each other,
the equilibrium outcome depends on the relative priority assigned to each of these two objectives. Accordingly,








!c + b   a
1   
(7)
denotes the gross outside income of primary sector workers in excess of the level of tax exemption and L(m) is
the demand for labour in the domestic primary sector, that is,
L(m) = (N   m)xd(m): (8)
The preference parameter  > 0 captures the relative weight the union attaches to the objective of maximising
the primary sector employment at the expense of achieving a higher wage.18,19
As the primary sector good accounts only for a fraction of the workers' purchasing expenses, the union
does not internalise the price eect of its wage-setting decision. Moreover, the union ignores the impact of the
primary sector wage on the government's tax policy decisions, that is to say, it does not take the government
budget constraint into account.20 In line with Lommerud et al. (2006), the rst order condition for the union's
maximisation problem can be expressed in terms of the wage elasticity of labour demand, , as follows:
!o




18A similar approach is employed in Lommerud et al. (2006), among others. If  ! 0, the union is inclined to disregard the
employment eects of changes in the wage rate and aims primarily at maximising the net-of-tax wage surplus with respect to the
secondary sector pay. This is a special case of the \Seniority model" in Oswald (1993). Values of  smaller (larger) than 1 reect a
union that is \wage-oriented" (\employment-oriented"). When  = 1 the union's interest lies in maximising the total union rent.
19Empirical attempts to determine how the wage setting process depends on the union's preferences are scarce. A survey of British
trade union leaders conducted by Clark and Oswald (1993) suggests that generally more weight is placed on wage increases than
on employment increases. Likewise, in an eort to estimate union power parameters across ve European countries and a range of
manufacturing sectors, Dumont et al. (2006) report evidence to indicate that trade unions tend to be wage-oriented, with German
and French unions exhibiting particularly pronounced preferences towards wage orientation compared to their Belgian, Italian and
UK counterparts.
20See van der Ploeg (2006) for similar assumptions.





L(m). Hence, the equilibrium sectoral wage markup is decreasing in  and in the union's
relative preference for employment over wages. Clearly, positive wages imply  > 1= and therefore a wage-
(employment-) oriented union chooses the equilibrium wage in the elastic (inelastic) part of the labour demand
curve. Explicitly solving for the equilibrium primary sector wage, the rst-order condition for a maximum of the










where the second-order condition always holds.21 In words, the wage in the primary sector is a weighted sum of
the maximum wage compatible with positive prots and the outside wage. I impose
 + m!f
1 + m
> !o  !f: (10)
The rst inequality reects the notion that, in net terms, secondary sector workers earn less than primary sector
workers and implies @(!1(m))=@ < 0. The latter inequality guarantees that !1(m)  !f 8 , thus enabling
us to take account of the role of asymmetries in international labour costs. For reasons of analytic tractability
and in conformity with the empirical results in Dumont et al. (2006), throughout the following I shall restrict
attention to values of  between 0 and 1.22
4.3 Implications of oshoring with given tax structure
Assuming for the time being that the global distribution of primary sector rms is exogenously given, it is
instructive to consider what happens when the oshoring intensity, m, increases.23 First, quantity competition
implies that rms in the domestic country experience lower prots when the share of rival rms producing at lower
cost abroad increases. As this lowers the rents to be shared with workers, oshoring puts downward pressure on
21This is readily seen from the rst-order condition: V!1 =  + m!f + !o(1 + m)   (1 + m)(1 + )!1 = 0.
22C.f. footnote 14.
23Since the total number of primary sector rms is assumed xed, m interchangeably denotes the number and the share of
oshoring rms.







(1 + m)2 < 0: (11)



































where it is useful to note that






















Hence the following proposition.
Proposition 1. An increase in the (exogenous) oshoring intensity has the following implications: (i) the prots
from sales in the domestic market of any (non-oshoring) primary industry rm fall, regardless of its production
location, (ii) the aggregate domestic (foreign) output and employment in the primary sector fall (increase), (iv)
the total primary industry output increases and therefore (v) the price of the primary sector good decreases. All
described eects fade as the oshoring intensity increases.
Proof. See Appendix B.
12A straightforward interpretation is that, as more rms have access to lower-cost labour, both the rms located
abroad and the rms producing in the domestic country lose in terms of individual competitive advantage over
rival rms. Only the rm that relocates improves its relative position in the market, as shall be shown in the
next section. At the same time, as more rms produce at lower costs, the total scale of output is expanded, and
the primary sector good becomes less expensive in the domestic country. Hence, oshoring is associated with
lower consumption costs.
An essential property of the model is that the impact experienced by domestic workers, as primary sector
jobs move oshore, is not symmetric and crucially depends on the union preference parameter . In particular,
Proposition 1 implies that while some domestic workers lose their jobs and must accept employment in the
secondary sector, other workers suer in terms of wage cuts that go along with shrinking prots. Generally, the
more wage-oriented the union is, the more rationed primary sector jobs are. Yet, due to the stronger reliance on
prot, a more wage-oriented union reacts more sensitively to changes in the industry's oshoring intensity. The



















Proposition 2. Oshoring raises the wage responsiveness of labour demand. The more wage-oriented the union
is (the lower ), the more pronounced the wage cuts in the primary sector and the smaller the number of primary
sector jobs lost following an increase in the share of rms that oshore.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The idea behind Proposition 2 is fairly straightforward. Low values of  are indicative of a strong asymmetry
between domestic and foreign primary sector wages. Therefore, taking as given the wages, rms that relocate
experience a substantial gain in competitive advantage over domestically located rms. By the same token, the
latter see their prots shrink to a greater extent (see (3)). As seen from (9), the more wage-oriented the trade
union is, the stronger its reliance on the capacity of the domestic primary industry to generate excess prots
in the face of foreign competition. This is why a more wage-oriented union reacts more strongly to oshoring
13events (see (11)).24 As a consequence, the fall in the domestic demand for primary industry workers caused by
an increase in the share of low-wage competitors turns out to be less severe the more wage-oriented the union is.
The notion that deeper global economic integration has contributed to an increase in labour demand elasticities
is well established (e.g. Rodrick, 1997). Recently, Senses (2010) empirically tested this hypothesis by focusing
explicitly on the role of oshoring in aecting the sensitivity of employment to wages. By means of plant-level
data in the U.S. manufacturing sector in the time period 1972-2001 and using various proxies for oshoring she
nds a positive association between the ease with which jobs can be oshored and the magnitude of labour
demand elasticities. In a similar vein, recent empirical work by Baumgarten et al. (2010) based on individual-
level data of workers in the German manufacturing industry between 1991 and 2006 conrms that workers whose
jobs are subject to oshoring experience substantial wage cuts. The wage cuts are shown to be particularly
pronounced when the authors control for the mobility of workers across sectors.
4.4 The location of industrial production
Conditional on the government's choice of tax policy, primary sector rms base the decision on whether to locate
their production in the domestic country or abroad upon a comparison of prots before and after an eventual
relocation. That is, they anticipate the consequences for wages and prots. A location equilibrium is a vector
of relocating and non relocating rms with the property that no rm wants to change its location decision given
what other rms are doing. In particular, using (6) an oshoring equilibrium can be summarised by a number
b m of rms that locate their production in the foreign country such that
f(b m)   K = d(b m   1) > 0; (16)
where K captures all the lump-sum costs associated with oshoring. Generally, technological advances that ease
the cross-border movement of production facilities, goods and services contribute to lower K. Moreover, the
costs of relocating typically decrease with distance (Head et al., 2009) and when, from the perspective of rms,
the foreign infrastructure and the regulatory environment become relatively more attractive.25
24In the real world, the higher wage sensitivity may take the form of oering relatively lower wages to a part of the workers within
the rm which contributes to a lower average primary sector wage.
25This is not to insinuate that all rms serving the domestic market originate from the domestic country. Firms that face the
option between dierent locations might choose to locate in the foreign country to begin with. In that case, a fall in K reduces the
incentives to shift production from the foreign to the domestic country. Only if K were suciently negative would a relocation of
14Unionisation in the labour market and the assumptions in (10) guarantee that a wage gap between the
domestic and the foreign country exists for all values of m. This implies that for all m, rms relocating abroad
have a higher production level in equilibrium. To see this dene
x(m) = xf(m)   xd(m   1); (17)
which is the change in equilibrium output resulting for an individual domestic rm that decides to oshore given





m > 0; we can rewrite x(m)











which is strictly positive for all m and strictly
decreasing with m (see Appendix D). The intuition behind the latter property is simple: as more rival rms
gain access to lower-cost labour, the relative cost advantage of the rms located abroad diminishes; hence, under
quantity competition, further relocations have incrementally less impact on the output of domestically located
competitors. It follows that the incentives to relocate attenuate as more and more rms relocate. Clearly, in the
absence of positive relocation costs all rms would prefer to oshore. I shall assume that in equilibrium K is
large enough to ensure that an interior solution to (16) always exists. Denoting
(m) = f(m)   d(m   1); (18)
we have that if (1) > K > (N), there will be an interior relocation equilibrium with 0 < b m < N. In
particular, since (m) is strictly decreasing with m, b m is the largest value of m such that (m) > K. The
following lemma is an obvious consequence of what has been stated so far.
Lemma 1. Assume K is given. As the share of rival producers that are located abroad increases, the gain in






Proof. See Appendix D.
production from a low- to a high-wage country take place - a scenario which is not considered here.
15Figure 1 illustrates the essential relationships. Referring to Proposition 2, the following lemma shall prove
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Figure 1: The share of foreign producers as determined by the equilibrium condition (16), assuming a given tax structure.
important for the analysis:
Lemma 2. Assume K is given and suppose that the oshoring intensity in the primary industry increases.
The reduction in the prot gap entailed by relocating to lower-wage countries is the more pronounced the more




Proof. See Appendix E.
The explanation for this statement is simple as it follows the same line of reasoning as Proposition 2. Because
a union that is relatively more wage-oriented reacts more sensitively to changes in outward production relocations,
the prot gap between rms located in the domestic and the foreign country narrows more quickly as m increases.
It follows that the oshoring incentives are curtailed more severely when  is low, i.e. the slope in Figure 1 becomes
steeper.
165 Tax policy and welfare
The government has two instruments to inuence the economy: the tax rate on primary sector workers' labour
income () and the level of tax exemption (a). The tax revenue is used to nance the employee-based subsidy
(b) conceded to secondary sector workers. While the level of the subsidy is taken to be xed, the total amount
of redistribution is endogenous as the size of the secondary sector depends on the employment in the primary
sector which is determined by m and by the primary sector wage. The latter variables, in turn, are aected by





 (T   L(m))b:
It is assumed that the prot income of domestic shareholders is perfectly diversied. Being residents of a small
open economy they only hold a small share of nancial assets in the domestic market. Accordingly, a benevolent
government considers the sum of individual utilities (1) of the T domestic consumer-workers to be the relevant
welfare criterion. Hence, Tu(x;y) is maximised subject to the public and private budget constraints and taking
into account the market demand function for good x. Assuming that the budget constraints hold with equality,
the government's objective function can be expressed in terms of the total pre-tax domestic labour income, !,
and the domestic consumer surplus generated in the primary sector:26
U = Tu(x;y) = !(m) +
1
2
(   p)X(m); (19)
where
!(m) := L(m)!1(m) + (T   L(m))!c: (20)
Note that due to the assumption of pure redistribution (i.e. what is taxed away from the high-income workers
is used to nance transfers for the low-income workers), what matters in terms of welfare from the viewpoint
of the government is the total pre-tax labour income, rather than the total net labour income. Contrary to
26Specically, the following substitutions are made: y = s[!1(1   ) + a] + (1   s)(!c + b)   px, s = T 1(N   m)xd(m), and
p = p(X) =    (X=T). See Hauer and Mittermaier (2011) for a similar approach.
17Lommerud et al. (2004), the perspective taken here is that of a government not primarily concerned about
income redistribution. Rather, as motivated in the introduction, the trade-o between cheaper consumption and
higher income caused by tax policies in the presence of oshoring is at the center of the analysis. As seen in (19),
welfare is increasing in the share of workers employed in the unionised sector. On the other hand, the consumer
prices generally decrease in the share of rms that produce oshore. The question raised in the following sections
is whether, and by what mechanism, a reduction in tax progression is compatible with welfare maximisation.
5.1 Comparative statics eects of tax reforms within the primary sector
The consequences of changes in the tax parameters  and a result from totally dierentiating the pivotal equilib-
rium equations that determine the primary wage rate and the geographic distribution of the primary industry,
that is, equations (9) and (16). From these, one can infer the implications for the domestic primary sector
rm-level employment. Before analysing the implications of tax progression, it is useful to consider the eects of
a change in each individual policy instrument.
5.1.1 The eects of raising the level of labour income taxation
I depart from a proportional tax system in the primary sector, assuming a = 0 throughout this section, and
explore the implications of raising the (average) labour tax rate intended to redistribute income among workers.
























(1 ). Essentially, the intuition behind
(21) is that the union wants to compensate primary sector workers for the higher tax rate and therefore pushes
for a higher gross wage; however, as this augments the gap between domestic and foreign labour costs, precaution
27See Appendix G for a derivation.
18is taken and the benets of a higher wage compensation are weighed against the associated domestic primary
sector employment losses - which by denition are of less concern to a more wage-oriented union. Importantly,
it is precisely because the oshoring incentives under Cournot competition are gradually tempered as more rms
relocate (
@(m)
@m < 0, as described in Lemma 1), that the union is in a position to demand a higher wage {
notwithstanding the deterioration in international labour cost competitiveness. Referring to (3), the impact on




















The sign of (23) follows from (21) and from totally dierentiating the locational equilibrium expression (16) with

















(N   m)xf(m) + mxd(m   1)

> 0: (25)
Clearly, a higher equilibrium domestic wage and the associated lower domestic prots imply a higher equilibrium
oshoring intensity. The following proposition summarises the results.
Proposition 3. An increase in the average labour tax rate, at constant progressivity, creates pressure on the
wage level. The deterioration in international competitiveness triggers outward relocations of production. Those
rms that maintain their production facilities in the domestic country experience lower prots and reduce their
rm-level employment, thus further rationing domestic primary sector jobs.
This is consistent with the ndings in Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) and Koskela and Sch ob (2010) insofar
as a rise in the tax wedge increases the wage pressure in non-competitive labour markets and induces rms to
substitute toward the relatively less expensive foreign labour. The dierence here is that high and low-cost rms
co-exist and engage in strategic competition for market shares in the domestic market. Tax reforms therefore
19not only aect workers but also rms in an asymmetric way. As expected, the eects of a rise in the level of
tax exemption are converse. Note from (9) that the union's willingness to set a lower equilibrium wage increases
when workers enjoy a higher level of tax exemption. Since the partial derivative of the primary sector wage with




























5.1.2 The eects of changing the degree of tax progression
A progressive tax system requires that the marginal tax rate be higher than the average tax rate. The average
tax rate is given by a =
!
1(m) a
!1(m) . Hence, progression is present when  > 0 and a > 0. Following the
approach adopted in Fuest (2000), an increase in the degree of tax progression is achieved by simultaneously
raising the marginal tax rate and the level of tax exemption. Accordingly, starting from an equilibrium with a
proportional tax system (a = 0), I consider a change in the degree of tax progression that keeps the average tax
rate constant. Moreover, to ensure that the reform is revenue-neutral, it is required that initially  = a = 0.
Totally dierentiating the average tax rate at a = 0 yields
da = 0 , d!1(m) = da: (27)


















!o > 0: (30)
This result is in line with empirical evidence28 showing that, contrary to an increase in the average tax rate, an
increase in the marginal tax rate (with unchanged average rate) reduces the pre-tax wage in unionised labour
markets. Intuitively, a change in the degree of tax progression, for given , alters the trade-o between a higher
net wage and higher employment present in the union objective function. Because under a less progressive tax
regime a smaller fraction of the wage increase is taxed, wage increases become relatively more attractive to
employment increases. Note that, according to (29), all eects in (21) continue to aect the magnitude of the







=  m < 0: (31)








The results are in accordance with those of Koskela and Sch ob (2010) in that a rise in labour tax progression
increases employment even if employers can substitute low-cost foreign for domestic labour input.
5.2 The welfare eects of tax progression






















28See e.g. Lockwood and Manning (1993), Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) and Schneider (2005).
21In order to gain insight on the workings of this expression, I proceed in parts.
5.2.1 The domestic labour income


































Considering a decrease in the progressivity of the tax schedule, the interpretation of (33) is as follows. The
rst term in brackets in the rst line describes how the increase in labour costs in the domestic primary sector
contributes to a lower domestic primary sector rm-level employment, while the second term captures the benet
of this policy reform, namely, that those incumbent domestic workers who remain employed in the primary
industry experience a higher net wage income subsequent to the reform. The second line in (33) reects the
consequences of the higher oshoring intensity. Specically, less domestic workers now enjoy the sectoral wage
surplus due to two reasons: as the share of rivals producing at lower wages increases, the domestic rm-level
primary sector output falls; moreover, the number of primary sector employers operating domestically is reduced.
It is easily seen that the total sum of domestic wage income increases with the degree of tax progression, regardless
of the union's specic preferences.29 Intuitively, this happens because the total domestic wage income is increasing
with the share of domestic workers that work in the unionised primary sector, which in turn is decreasing with
the domestic primary sector pre-tax wage. To summarise:
Proposition 4. Starting from a proportional tax system, a revenue-neutral reform that lowers (raises) the degree
of labour tax progression leads to (i) a higher (lower) domestic gross and net primary sector wage, (ii) a higher
(lower) domestic net-of-tax wage inequality, (iii) a lower (higher) share of primary sector rms that produce
domestically, (iv) a fall (rise) in their prot and output levels, (v) a contraction (expansion) of the domestic
29First, note that the term in the second line of (33) is positive. Then, remark that the term in brackets in the rst line is
increasing in !1(m). Therefore, after substituting (3) into xd(m) and replacing  by its upper bound ( = 1), one can verify that
the expression is equal to
T(1+m)(!o !c)
(1+N) > 0.
22primary sector output and employment, and (vi) a lower (higher) aggregate domestic wage income.
5.2.2 The total primary industry output
























which, considering a decrease in the degree of tax progression, has the following interpretation. The rst term in
brackets captures the eect that, in terms of labour costs, domestic production becomes relatively less competitive
compared to foreign production and, since the own-wage eect dominates, the price of the primary good increases.
In other words, the fall in output caused by the loss in competitiveness of rms located in the domestic country is
not oset by an equivalent increase in foreign output. This eect, denoted as 'competitiveness eect', contributes
to a lower domestic consumer surplus. On the other hand, the second term in brackets in (34) exerts a positive
eect on the consumer surplus: due to the persisting labour cost advantage at the foreign location, domestic
consumers generally benet from a higher share of foreign production in total production; since a decrease in the
progressivity of the domestic tax system is associated with a higher equilibrium oshoring intensity, domestic
consumers enjoy lower prices. I shall denote this as the 'import eect'. The sign of (34) is ambiguous as it
depends on which of these two inuences dominates.
5.2.3 The overall eect of lowering tax progression
The following proposition can be put forward by combining the information from the previous sections.
Proposition 5. Starting from a proportional tax system, a revenue-neutral reform that lowers (raises) the degree
of labour tax progression lowers (increases) social welfare if the union is suciently wage-oriented.
Proof. We have seen that the aggregate labour income in the domestic country decreases when the tax system
becomes less progressive. This is regardless of the union-specic preferences. The ambiguity as to whether a
lower degree of tax progression is desirable from the perspective of the policy-maker therefore stems from the
counteracting eects on the domestic consumer surplus inherent in (34). Note that this ambiguity arises only in
the presence of oshoring. If the costs of relocating production are prohibitively high, a reduction in the degree
23of tax progression has unambiguous eects on welfare as both the labour income and the consumer surplus
decrease.30 In essence, oshoring opens up the possibility that domestic consumers are more than compensated
for both the reduction in labour income and the loss in domestic competitiveness, provided that they face







































xd(m   1) + (N   m)2x(m)

;
where  := (N   m)(1 + N)   N(1 + m) and the expression for x(m) > 0 is given in Section 4.4. Since  > 0
and 	 > 0 for all  > 0, and lim!0(  + ) =
@!
1(m)
@m (N   m)2x(m) < 0, it is readily seen that the primary
industry output is increasing in the degree of tax progression when  is suciently low. Invoking section 5.2.2
we can infer that in this case the competitiveness eect dominates over the import eect. It follows that welfare
increases in the degree of tax progression provided that the union puts sucient weight on the wage target at
the expense of the employment target in its objective of maximising the labour income in the domestic primary
sector.
The intuition builds on the interpretation of equations (21) and (29). Confronted with a lower degree of tax
progression, the trade union generally nds that wage increases become a relatively more eective means to raise
the labour income in the primary industry compared to employment increases. By denition, this is the more
pronounced the more wage-oriented the union is. At the same time, an increase in the domestic wage increases
the primary sector rms' prot opportunities entailed in relocating to lower wage countries, and therefore induces
a higher oshoring intensity. The rms, however, anticipate that oshoring tends to dampen the domestic wage,
30It is easily seen that when m = m = 0, both expressions (33) and (34) and hence (32) are positive.
24especially if  is low (see Proposition 2). For this reason, they anticipate that in this case incremental oshoring
will narrow the prot gap between the domestic and the foreign production location more quickly (see Lemma
2). Since the incentives to relocate are more sharply reduced, less rms oshore as a reaction to the tax reform.
As a consequence, the benets of a higher oshoring intensity are too weak to overcompensate the loss in the
international wage competitiveness of domestic production, causing a loss in the domestic consumer surplus.
This completes the motivation for Proposition 5.
Does a reduction in the degree of tax progression always translate into lower welfare? In order to provide
a more general description on the workings of the model and given the rather complicated calculation of b m in
(16), it is appropriate to make use of a mathematical software. Ideally, one would plot the change in welfare as
a function of the two exogenous variables of interest that determine the equilibrium oshoring intensity, namely
 and K. Note that, invoking (6) and (9), the subsequent comparative statics properties from (16) can be
established @ b m
@K < 0 and @ b m




















which simplies expression (32) while retaining its sign as the positive term in parenthe sis cancels. Accordingly,
Figure 2 implicitly delivers information on how the welfare impact of a change in tax progression depends on K
and on . The parameter values used are  = 10; = !c = !f = 1;!o = 1:2;N = 10;T = 100 and are highly
















Figure 2: The change in welfare due to an increase in labour tax progression with dierent degrees of wage orientation of the
domestic trade union.
25representative.31 Given the endogeneity of b m some caution is needed in reading this graph. Specically, higher
values of b m along a curve (i.e. given ) imply lower equilibrium levels of b K, where b K(b m;) denotes the level
of K such that b m rms oshore. Moreover, if b m is held xed, higher values of  (i.e. a downward shift of the
curve) can only be an equilibrium if b K decreases accordingly. Alternatively, in Figure 3 I plot the tax policy
induced change in welfare against  and for dierent levels of b K. Again, higher values of  for given b m must be





m = N − 1
= N − 3 m
= N − 4 m
δ
Figure 3: The change in welfare due to an increase in labour tax progression with dierent levels of xed oshoring costs.
associated with lower levels of b K, while for a given value of  lower values of b m require higher levels b K. The clear
message that emerges from these gures is that a decrease in tax progression tends to decrease (increase) social
welfare if  is low (high) and/or K is high (low). Figure 4 synthesises this information where the area denoted
by a plus (minus) sign denotes combinations of  and K such that welfare increases (decreases) with the degree
of tax progression and K denotes the level of costs such that b m = N   1.
6 Concluding remarks
Based on the notion that high marginal tax rates are not sustainable in the face of increasingly mobile tax
bases, many OECD countries have reduced the degree of personal income tax progressivity in the last decades.
The present paper has contributed to the theoretical analysis of labour income tax progression by incorporating








Figure 4: The welfare impact due of an increase in labour tax progression depends on the combinations of  and K.
strategically interacting oligopolistic rms that may oshore production to lower cost locations. Paradoxically,
the ndings suggest that the very presence of mobile tax bases in the form of production relocations may, under
certain conditions, strengthen the case for tax progression when the labour market in a small open welfare
economy is segmented into an oligopolistic unionised sector and a competitive non-unionised sector. Specically,
the analysis indicates that an average household, dened as one that derives its income from labour, is worse o
under a less progressive tax schedule, provided that the domestic labour market institutions are such that the
interests of insiders heavily dominate over those of outsiders. In contrast, under a more balanced representation of
workers a less progressive tax system enhances welfare as the benets of cheaper consumption oset the negative
domestic employment eects associated with a higher oshoring intensity. In substance, the results share a
fundamental insight gained from earlier studies on tax progression under imperfect labour markets (e.g. van der
Ploeg (2006) and Lommerud et al. (2004)), namely, that in a second-best world distortionary progressive labour
taxes may be required to oset other distortions created by labour market institutions.
As with any highly stylised model, the results should be interpreted cautiously. For one thing, I have taken
the perspective of an economy where jobs are internationally mobile while workers themselves are immobile.
Moreover, it is fundamental to stress that the analysis allows for homogeneous domestic workers receiving dierent
wages. This bears special relevance in the real world when the number of jobs in the higher value-added sectors
substantially falls short of the number of workers that possess sucient qualications to work in such sectors.
Some of the labour market trends mentioned at the beginning of this paper certainly point in that direction.
27Still, future research may benet from explicitly controlling for the possible mismatch between the demand for
and the availability of particular qualications. A further point concerns the role of prots and prot taxation.
The present paper restricts the number of policy instruments to wage-related taxes. Since a decrease in labour
tax progression may entail a redistribution of income from labour to shareholders, an extended model could
incorporate such questions by taking into account the joint determination of labour and capital taxation. In light
of the compelling evidence that governments strategically interact with each other when setting their taxes on
mobile capital, this would require the consideration of tax competition.
Appendix
A Statutory income tax progressivity for single individuals at average earnings
Figure A.1: This gure is extracted from Johansson et al. (2008). The measure of progressivity used is the dierence between the
marginal and average personal income tax rates, divided by one minus the average personal income tax rate, for an average single
production worker. Higher numbers indicate higher progressivity.
28B Proof of Proposition 1
Recalling (13), we have that
@L(m)
@m








+ (N   m)
@2xd(m)
@m2 > 0;




@m2 = 0. Next, using (4), (11), (12) and (14) yields:
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C Proof of Proposition 2
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2 > 0:
D Proof of Lemma 1
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> 0: (D.2)
Note that due to (12)
@(m)
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which completes the proof of Lemma 1.
E Proof of Lemma 2
First note that substituting (9) into (3), we obtain
xd(m   1) =
T
(1 + N)(1 + )
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(1+) . To prove Lemma 2 it
suces to show that
@!1(m)
@m
(1 + N)(1   )
(1 + )








(1 + N)(1   )
(1 + )








!o   !f @2xf(m)
@m@
; (E.2)











   !f   m
 
!o   !f
  (1 + N)
(   !f)
(1 + m)




31The sign follows from noting that the expression in the square parenthesis is decreasing with . Setting  = 0, it





















































































@!1 > 0: (F.1)
G The wage eect of raising the average tax rate



















































Aronsson, T. and T. Sj ogren (2004), Ecient taxation, wage bargaining and policy coordination, Journal of
Public Economics 88, 2711-2725.
Baumgarten, D., I. Geishecker and H. G org (2010), Oshoring, tasks, and the skill-wage pattern, CEPR Discus-
sion Paper No. 7756.
Bentolila, S., J. J. Dolado and J. F. Jimeno (2008), Two-tier employment protection reforms: The Spanish ex-
perience, CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 6(4),
49{56.
Blinder, A.S. (2006), Oshoring: The next industrial revolution?, Foreign Aairs85:2, 113{128.
Boeri, T. (2010), Institutional reforms in European labour markets. In Handbook of Labour Economics, ed. O.
Ashenfelter and D. Card, vol. 4A. North Holland.
Bosch, G. and T. Kalina (2008), Low-wage work in Germany: An overview. In Low{wage work in Germany, ed.
G. Bosch and C. Weinkopf. Russel Sage Foundation , New York.
Cahuc, P., F. Postel-Vinay. and J. Robin (2006), Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: Theory and evidence,
Econometrica 74, 323-364.
Clark, A. and A. Oswald (1993), Trade union utility functions: A survey of union leaders' views, Industrial
Relations 32, 391{411.
Dolado, J. J., F. Felgueroso. and J. F. Jimeno (2000), Youth labour markets in Spain: Education, training, and
crowding-out, European Economic Review 44, 943{956.
Dolado, J. J., C. Garcia-Serrano, and J. F. Jimeno (2002), Drawing lessons from the boom of temporary jobs in
Spain, Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society 112, F270{F295.
Dumont, M., G. Rayp and P. Willem e (2006), Does internationalization aect union bargaining power? An em-
pirical study for ve EU countries, Oxford Economic Papers 58, 77{102.
European Commission (2007), Taxation trends in the European Union, Luxemburg, Oce for Ocial Publica-
tions of the European Communities.
European Commission (2008), Employment in Europe 2008. Recent trends and prospects, Luxemburg, Oce
for Ocial Publications of the European Communities.
European Commission (2010), Employment in Europe 2010, chapter 3.2. Two-tier EPL and the growth of tem-
porary work, Luxemburg, Oce for Ocial Publications of the European Communities.
European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) (2005), Relocation of production and industrial relations,
available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/11/study/tn0511101s.htm (last accessed: 16 Jan-
uary 2012).
Fuest, C. (2000), Steuerpolitik und Arbeitslosigkeit, Mohr Siebeck, T ubingen.
Green, F. and Y. Zhu (2010), Overqualication, job dissatisfaction, and increasing dispersion in the returns to
graduate education, Oxford Economic Papers 62, 740{763.
Grossman, G.M., E. Rossi-Hansberg (2008), Trading tasks: A simple theory of oshoring, American Economic
Review 98, 1978-1997.
Harms, P., O. Lorz and D. Urban (2009), Oshoring along the production chain, CESifo Working Paper No.
2564, Munich.
Hauer, A. and F. Mittermaier (2011), Unionisation triggers tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment,
Economic Journal 121, 793{818.
33Head, K., T. Mayer and J. Ries (2009), How remote is the oshoring threat?, European Economic Review 53,
429{444.
Hijzen A. and P. Swaim (2010), Oshoring,labour market institutions and the elasticity of labour demand, Eu-
ropean Economic Review 54, 1016-1034.
Hoel, M. (1990), Eciency wages and income taxes, Journal of Economics 51, 89{99.
Johansson,  A., C. Heady, J. Arnold, B. Brys and L. Varia (2008), Tax and economic growth, OECD Economics
Department Working Paper No. 620.
Karabay, B. and J. MacLaren (2010), Trade, oshoring, and the invisible handshake, Journal of International
Economics 82, 26-34.
Keuschnigg, C. and E. Ribi (2009), Outsourcing, unemployment and welfare policy, Journal of International
Economics 78, 168-176.
Kleven, H. J. and P. B. Srensen (2004), Labour tax reform, the good jobs and the bad jobs, The Scandinavian
Journal of Economics 106, 45-64.
Koskela, E. and R. Sch ob (2005), Optimal capital taxation in economies with unionized and competitive labour
markets, Oxford Economic Papers 57, 717{73.
Koskela, E. and R. Sch ob (2010), Outsourcing of unionized rms and the impact of labor market policy reforms,
Review of International Economics 18, 682-695.
Koskela, E. and J. Vilmunen (1996), Tax progression is good for employment in popular models of trade union
behaviour, Labour Economics 3, 65{80.
Lockwood, B. and A. Manning (1993), Wage setting and the tax system, Theory and evidence for the United
Kingdom, Journal of Public Economics 52, 1-29.
Lockwood, B., T. Slk and T. Trans (2000), Progressive taxation: some evidence for Denmark, The Scandina-
vian Journal of Economics 102, 707-723.
Lommerud, K. E., B. Sandvik, and O. R. Straume (2004), Good jobs, bad jobs and redistribution, The Scandi-
navian Journal of Economics 106, 703-720.
Lommerud K. E., F. Meland and O. R. Straume (2006), Globalisation and union opposition to technological
change, Journal of International Economics 68, 1-23.
Lucifora, C., A. McKnight and W. Salverda (2005), Low-wage employment in Europe: a review of the evidence,
Socio-Economic Review 3, 259{292.
Neary, J. P. (2003), Globalisation and market structure, Journal of the European Economic Association 1, 245{
271.
OECD (2006), Fundamental reform of personal income tax, Tax Policy Study No. 13, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2007), Oshoring and employment: Trends and impacts, OECD, Paris.
Oswald, A. J. (1993), Ecient contracts are on the labour demand curve: Theory and facts, Labour Economics
1, 85{113.
Pogorelskiy, K., C. Seidl and S. Traub (2010), Tax progression: International and intertemporal comparisons us-
ing LIS data, ECINEQ WP 2010-184.
Rocha-Akis, S. and R. Sch ob (2011), Welfare policy in the presence of unionised labour and internationally mo-
bile rms , Scandinavian Journal of Economics 113, 93{119.
Rodrik, D. (1997), Has globalization gone too far?, Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C.
34Saint-Paul, G. (1996), Dual labor markets: a macroeconomic perspective, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Scheve, K., Slaughter, M.J. (2004), Economic insecurity and the globalization of production, American Journal
of Political Science 48, 662-674.
Schneider, K. (2005), Union wage setting and progressive income taxation with heterogeneous labor: theory and
evidence from the German income tax reforms 1986-1990, Labour Economics 12, 205{222.
Schratzenstaller, M. and A. Wagener (2009), The Austrian income tax tari, 1955-2006, Empirica 36, 309-330.
Senses, M. Z. (2010), The eects of oshoring on the elasticity of labor demand, Journal of International Eco-
nomics 81, 89-98.
The Economist (2006), A survey of the world economy. More pain than gain., Sep 14th 2006.
van der Ploeg, F. (2006), Do social policies harm employment? Second-best eects of taxes and benets on
labor markets, in: Jonas Agell and Peter Birch Srensen (eds.), Tax policy and labor market performance,
Cambridge, MIT Press.
Visser, J. (2006), Union membership statistics in 24 Countries, Monthly Labor Review 129, 38{4.
35